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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3607 
___________ 
 
JEAN COULTER,  
                                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNKNOWN PROBATION OFFICER; EXTENDED STAY AMERICA;  
COLLEEN MURPHY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-02067) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2014 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 17, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Jean Coulter appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders dismissing 
her civil rights complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and denying her motion 
for reconsideration brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.  
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 Coulter, who was under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation 
and Parole at all times relevant to the complaint, filed this action against Unknown 
Probation Officer (“Unknown Officer”), as well as Extended Stay America and its area 
manager for Southeastern Pennsylvania, Colleen Murphy (“Extended Stay defendants”).  
For over a year, Coulter had resided in an Extended Stay America property in Butler 
County, Pennsylvania.  In 2011, she received permission to relocate to Philadelphia.  
Pursuant to this, she contacted defendant Murphy at Extended Stay America in Horsham, 
Pennsylvania.  Coulter was ultimately denied housing at the Horsham Extended Stay, and  
was subsequently informed that she could no longer reside at the Extended Stay in Butler 
County. 
 According to the complaint, defendant Murphy refused Coulter residence at the 
Extended Stay America in Horsham based on “half-truths” and “out-right falsifications” 
told by Unknown Officer to Murphy.  Unknown Officer allegedly represented to Murphy 
that he could not approve of the Horsham residence because the facility could not handle 
electronic monitoring, a restriction which Coulter averred was not a condition of her 
probation.  Coulter further alleged that the defendants entered into a conspiracy to 
“impose added restriction on [her] residence.”  Coulter maintained that, by their actions, 
defendants forced her to live in Western Pennsylvania, violating her rights to due process 
and fundamental housing, as well as restricting her freedom of association.  
 The District Court construed the complaint liberally as stating the following 
claims: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment right to housing claim; (2) a housing discrimination 
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claim under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.; (3) a First 
Amendment right of association claim; (4) a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to 
substantive due process claim; (5) criminal conspiracy; and (6) a Sixth Amendment right 
to a fair trial claim.  Initially, the District Court noted that the complaint could be 
dismissed with respect to Extended Stay defendants because they were private parties and 
Coulter had failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate they were acting on behalf of, 
or in concert with, a state actor.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild 
LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that “[t]o prevail on a § 1983 claim, a 
plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, in other words, that 
there was state action.”).  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that, even assuming these 
defendants were state actors, the complaint was subject to dismissal because Coulter 
failed to state a valid claim for relief.  Accordingly, the District Court, acting on 
Extended Stay defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and, in part, 
acting sua sponte, dismissed the complaint as to all defendants.  A subsequent motion for 
reconsideration was denied, and this appeal ensued.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the dismissal.  See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  To 
survive dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by 
including facts which “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).   
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 We agree with the District Court that the complaint wholly failed to state any facts 
giving rise to a plausible inference that Extended Stay defendants, a private corporation 
and its employee, acted under color of state law or conspired with Unknown Officer, an 
alleged state actor, to deprive Coulter of her constitutional rights.  According to the 
amended complaint, defendant Murphy initially indicated Coulter would be welcome at 
the Horsham Extended Stay, but that Murphy could not sign a “Home Provider Letter” 
until a lease was signed.  After Coulter arranged for inspection by probation officials, she 
was informed that the lease would not be signed because “Unknown Officer had 
‘rejected’ her residence in Extended Stay” after determining the facilities were 
unequipped to handle electronic monitoring.  Compl. at 4.  Coulter alleged that the 
Extended Stay defendants conspired with Unknown Officer “to impose added 
restrictions” -- electronic monitoring -- to her probation.  Coulter failed to substantiate 
this allegation.  She appears to assume that, because defendant Murphy changed her mind 
about approving the lease after “discussions” with Unknown Officer, Extended Stay 
defendants conspired to violate her constitutional rights.
1
  These conclusory allegations of 
conspiracy do not satisfy the plausibility standard of Rule 12(b)(6).  See id. at 678 
(“[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).  Accordingly, the 
                                              
1
 For example, in her brief on appeal, Coulter states that “as none of the ‘consequences’ 
commenced until after the discussions with Unknown Probation Officer occurred, it is a 
reasonable conclusion that the conversation was the cause of the injuries.”  Appellant’s 
Br. at 25. 
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claims against Extended Stay defendants were properly dismissed.  We will, therefore, 
review the claims only as they pertain to defendant Unknown Officer.
2
 
 In rejecting her FHA claim, the District Court determined that Coulter had failed 
to sufficiently allege that she was a member of a protected class, that she had applied for 
and was qualified for housing, and that housing opportunities remained available at that 
location.  See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(setting forth elements of an FHA claim).   In particular, the District Court noted that “the 
basis for the rejection of [Coulter’s] preferred place of residence” was because it could 
not handle electronic monitoring and thus she was “unqualified” to live at that particular 
location.  On appeal, Coulter asserts that she was not subject to electronic monitoring, 
and, therefore, the District Court’s dismissal of the claim was in error.  Even assuming 
Coulter was qualified, however, she does not take issue with the District Court’s 
                                              
2
 On appeal, Coulter challenges the District Court’s authority to sua sponte dismiss the 
complaint against Unknown Officer.  We have recognized that, after service of process, a 
district court noting the inadequacy of a complaint may, on its own, dismiss it for failure 
to state a claim provided it affords the litigant prior notice and an opportunity to respond. 
See Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 430 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Carroll v. Fort 
James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing cases).  While we need not 
decide the issue, we note that courts have upheld a district court’s authority to sua sponte 
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim against a non-moving defendant where it 
was clear the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief.  See Wachtler v. Cnty of Herkimer, 
35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994); accord Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 
(9th Cir. 1987).  Because, as the following discussion makes clear, the District Court 
properly dismissed the complaint based on grounds raised by Extended Stay defendants, 
but common to all defendants, and to which Coulter had an opportunity to respond, we 
find no merit to her argument.    
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conclusion that she failed to sufficiently plead the other elements of the FHA claim, nor 
do we find any basis for doing so. 
 Coulter also maintains that the District Court erroneously determined that 
defendant Unknown Officer had not violated her due process rights in imposing the 
electronic monitoring condition.  Significantly, Coulter does not allege that she was 
actually subjected to electronic monitoring, which might implicate due process concerns.  
She merely alleges that Unknown Officer’s false representations3 to defendant Murphy 
resulted in her inability to obtain the housing of her choice and restrictions on her 
freedom of association.  As the District Court noted, however, there is no constitutional 
right to housing of one’s choice.  See Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).  
Moreover, although as a probationer, Coulter’s right of association could be reasonably 
restricted, see United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1991), she failed to 
allege any facts which would suggest that her right was infringed.  The right to “freedom 
of association” extends to “choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human 
relationships.”  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).  Coulter’s 
allegations that she was deprived of associations with “individuals who chose a more 
urban lifestyle” and the “religious and political affiliations” available to those in Eastern 
Pennsylvania are woefully insufficient to state a claim for relief.  See Rode v. 
                                              
3
  In addition to the allegedly false representation about electronic monitoring, Coulter 
insists that she was refused residence at Extended Stay America because of defendant 
Unknown Officer’s “half-truths” and “out-right falsifications;” significantly, however, 
she never sets forth before the District Court the nature of the supposed “slander.” 
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Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1205 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that only personal relationships 
characterized by a high degree of selectivity and intimacy, “bound by blood,” or devoted 
towards the “creation and sustenance of a family” may garner First Amendment 
protection).  Furthermore, we agree with the District Court that Unknown Officer’s 
actions, as set forth in the complaint, do not “shock the conscience.”  See Newman v. 
Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that “only the most egregious official 
conduct” rises to the level of a substantive due process violation) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).    
 Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Finding 
no basis to alter or amend the judgment, we will also affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Coulter’s motion for reconsideration.  
